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•  In the past decade, trends in issuance have 
changed signiﬁ  cantly, both in the period leading 
up to the ﬁ  nancial crisis and subsequently. 
•  Prior to the crisis, there was a large increase in the 
issuance of riskier and more innovative forms of 
ﬁ  nancing, and a high level of future issuance will 
likely be required to reﬁ  nance this past issuance as 
it matures.
•  In Canada, the increased use of innovative and 
riskier ﬁ  nancing sources was less pronounced, 
and future reﬁ  nancing needs are more in line with 
historical issuance levels.
T
he increasing global issuance of innovative and 
riskier forms of ﬁ  nancing, such as subprime-
mortgage securitizations, contributed to the 
recent ﬁ  nancial crisis. This crisis and the subsequent 
regulatory response will have implications for the 
future issuance of corporate bonds, corporate equi-
ties, and securitization. 
Canada withstood the global crisis better than most 
other industrialized countries. This reﬂ  ected a number 
of core economic strengths, most notably a well-
capitalized ﬁ  nancial sector and strong corporate 
balance sheets. This position, in addition to differ-
ences in issuance patterns leading up to the crisis, 
means that the repercussions for Canadian issuers 
are somewhat different from those being experienced 
by issuers in other countries. 
The objective of this article is to provide an update on 
trends in issuance in Canada relative to those in other 
capital markets and, where possible, to assess the 
factors underlying these trends in the context of the 
ﬁ  nancial crisis.
1 It also aims to analyze the impact of 
the ﬁ  nancial crisis on Canadian corporate issuance, 
relative to historical issuance and to issuance patterns 
in other markets. To do so, it examines trends in cap-
ital markets in Canada and other regions over the past 
ten years, with a focus on three areas: the issuance of 
ﬁ  nancial and non-ﬁ  nancial corporate bonds, the issu-
ance of ﬁ  nancial and non-ﬁ  nancial corporate equity, 
and securitization.
2 
1  Kennedy (2004) and Freedman and Engert (2003) have examined the state of Canada’s 
capital markets, both historically and in comparison to those of other countries.
2  This article does not examine asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) and money 
markets. For a discussion of the Canadian ABCP market, see Kamhi and Tuer (2007a, 
2007b).
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Debt market composition
Roughly in line with economic growth, non-ﬁ  nancial 
Canadian corporate issuers have consistently 
increased their bonds outstanding over the past 
decade, with annual net issuance positive for most of 
the period (Chart 1). Nevertheless, there were notable 
differences in bond issuance. In 2001, in the ﬁ  rst half 
of 2008, and throughout 2009, non-ﬁ  nancial net bond 
issuance was larger than in the past. Some of this 
increase can be explained by a substitution from other 
sources of funding. For example, the increase in net 
corporate bond issuance in 2009 was more than 
offset by a reduction in short-term business credit. 
However, in the ﬁ  rst half of 2008, short-term business 
credit increased. The increase in both short-term 
business credit and net bond issuance in this period 
could be explained by precautionary borrowing: as 
economic conditions started to deteriorate during 
these periods, corporations accessed credit markets 
as a safeguard against worsening credit conditions.
Throughout the 1990s, the debt-to-equity ratio of 
Canadian non-ﬁ  nancial corporations was well above 
that of the United Kingdom and the United States 
(Côté and Graham 2007). However, notwithstanding 
the net positive bond issuance of Canadian non-
ﬁ  nancial corporations over the past decade, the debt-
to-equity ratio of non-ﬁ  nancial corporations has 
declined since 2002 and, at the end of 2009, was 
below that of the United Kingdom and the United 
States (Bank of Canada 2010). 
The net issuance of bonds by Canadian ﬁ  nancial 
institutions was also positive until the ﬁ  nancial crisis, 
leading to an increase in ﬁ  nancial bonds outstanding 
that outpaced economic growth as the amount of net 
bond issuance by ﬁ  nancial issuers rose from 2002 to 
2008. During the crisis, however (i.e., the second half 
of 2008 and the ﬁ  rst half of 2009), conditions in global 
markets deteriorated, with yield spreads on Canadian 
investment-grade ﬁ  nancial institutions widening out 
sharply from a pre-crisis level of about 50 basis points 
(bps) to a peak of around 400 bps.
3 In Canada, the 
introduction of the Insured Mortgage Purchase 
Program (IMPP) in October 2008, through which the 
government purchased a large amount of govern-
ment-insured, mortgage-backed securities from the 
banks, alleviated banks’ funding needs (Department 
of Finance 2008). As a result, net ﬁ  nancial bond issu-
ance turned negative, as the gross issuance of ﬁ  nan-
cial corporations fell (Chart 2).
4 
Credit spreads on investment-grade ﬁ  nancial institu-
tions widened out even more sharply in the United 
States, reaching close to 900 bps at the peak of the 
crisis (Bank of America Merrill Lynch). In October 
2008, to address worsening market conditions, the 
U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
announced the Debt Guarantee Program through 
which the FDIC guaranteed newly issued senior 
unsecured debt of insured depository institutions and 
most U.S. bank holding companies (FDIC 2008). This 
program was a vital source of funding for these insti-
tutions. Under the program, US$305 billion was 
issued—almost 40 per cent of average annual 
3  Source: Bank of America Merrill Lynch.
4  At $69 billion, the amount of government-insured, mortgage-backed securities pur-
chased through the IMPP more than offset the drop in ﬁ  nancial issuance in the second 
half of 2008 and the ﬁ  rst half of 2009 (Chart 2). 
Chart 1:  Net issuance of Canadian corporate bonds
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bonds in late 2007, which, until 2010, were denomin-
ated in foreign currencies.
6 Three Canadian banks 
had issued covered bonds by the end of 2008, and 
midway through 2010, all ﬁ  ve of the largest Canadian 
banks had issued covered bonds. The earlier issues 
were denominated in euros, since the market for euro 
covered bonds is the most developed, but more 
recently Canadian banks have also issued these 
bonds in Swiss francs, U.S. dollars, and Canadian 
dollars. In the wake of the ﬁ  nancial crisis, covered 
bonds have become an attractive funding alternative 
for banks because they allow the diversiﬁ  cation of 
their funding sources and investor base and can be 
cost-advantageous relative to the issuance of 
unsecured debt. 
At $24 billion, the covered bonds issued by Canadian 
banks to date represent less than 1 per cent of their 
total assets. Since banking regulation allows banks to 
issue up to 4 per cent of their total assets in covered 
bonds (OSFI 2007), there is the potential for more 
covered bond issuance in the future. This trend is 
likely to continue, since the federal government 
announced in its March 2010 budget that it will intro-
duce legislation on covered bonds in Canada, thus 
contributing to greater certainty about the structure 
and treatment of covered bonds. This, in turn, should 
help bolster investor conﬁ  dence and possibly lead to 
a decline in the associated cost of funding.
6  See Gravelle and McGuinness (2008) for a discussion of the covered bond market. 
Covered bonds are marketable debt securities backed by a dedicated pool of collateral, 
typically residential mortgage loans.
corporate (ﬁ  nancial and non-ﬁ  nancial) bond issuance 
from 2000 to 2007 and about half of the maximum 
amount of FDIC-guaranteed debt that could be issued 
by these entities.
5 
As a result of the elevated bond issuance by banks 
globally prior to the crisis, as well as a shortening of 
maturities on this bond issuance over the past ﬁ  ve 
years, a sizable amount of bank bonds will be 
maturing between now and 2012 (Moody’s 2010a). 
Thus, the concentrated need for issuance over this 
period could lead to heightened reﬁ  nancing risks. This 
is less of a problem in Canada, since the amount of 
bonds from Canadian ﬁ  nancial and non-ﬁ  nancial 
issuers maturing over the next few years is roughly in 
line with issuance prior to the crisis (Bank of Canada 
2010). 
The currency composition of debt 
markets
Bonds are issued in foreign currency for various rea-
sons. Some issuers choose to fund themselves in 
U.S. dollars as a natural hedge for U.S.-dollar cash 
ﬂ  ows. Other reasons to issue in the U.S. market 
include the ability to issue larger amounts of funds, 
given the greater market depth; the ability to issue 
bonds with a longer maturity (Freedman and Engert 
2003; Anderson, Parker, and Spence 2003); as well as 
the reduced all-in cost of that funding (i.e., after the 
cash ﬂ  ows from the bond are converted back into 
Canadian dollars) relative to domestic sources. 
From 2002 to 2006, the net issuance of foreign-
currency bonds by Canadian ﬁ  nancial and non-ﬁ  nancial 
corporations was low, relative to domestic bond issu-
ance over the same period and relative to foreign-
currency bond issuance over the preceding period 
(Chart 3). Since 2007, however, the net issuance of 
foreign-currency bonds by Canadian ﬁ  nancial and 
non-ﬁ  nancial corporations has increased relative to 
the period preceding the crisis.
In the wake of the ﬁ  nancial crisis, 
covered bonds have become an 
attractive funding alternative for banks.
5  This maximum amount was equal to 125 per cent of the face value of outstanding 
senior unsecured debt, as of 30 September 2008, that was scheduled to mature on or 
before 30 June 2009. For issuance under this program, refer to: http://www.fdic.gov/
regulations/resources/tlgp/total_issuance03-10.html. Average annual bond issuance 
data is from the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA).
Chart 3:  Net bond issuance by Canadian corporations
By currency
Note: Issues payable in foreign currencies have been converted into Canadian dollars at 
the average noon market rate for the month.
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bonds. 
Leading up to the ﬁ  nancial crisis, throughout 2006 
and the ﬁ  rst half of 2007, spreads on high-yield bonds 
narrowed substantially.
10 At the same time, the issu-
ance of high-yield bonds by global issuers increased 
as ﬁ  rms used this opportunity to either reﬁ  nance their 
current obligations at lower costs or to increase their 
leverage (Chart 5). This was facilitated by strong 
investor demand for higher-yielding, and relatively 
simple to understand, ﬁ  xed-income securities, given 
the low-interest-rate environment. A substantial frac-
tion of this global high-yield issuance was by large 
ﬁ  rms that drastically increased their leverage via 
leveraged buyouts (LBOs). 
10 Spreads on U.S. high-yield credit (based on the Bank of America Merrill Lynch index) 
narrowed from over 400 bps at the end of 2003 to under 250 bps in the middle of 2007, 
before widening sharply to over 1800 bps by the end of 2008.
The Canadian market had also become attractive to 
foreign issuers. By the end of 2007, the so-called 
Maple Bond market had developed and grown to 
$69 billion.
7 The development of this market can be 
attributed to a conﬂ  uence of factors, including the 
elimination by the Canadian federal government of the 
Foreign Property Rule in 2005 (which had previously 
capped tax-shielded investments by Canadians in 
foreign assets), the reduction in Canadian government 
debt issuance, and attractive rates on Can$/US$ 
basis swaps that resulted in attractive ﬁ  nancing rates 
for foreign issuers when the proceeds from the sale of 
Maple Bonds were converted back into the issuer’s 
funding currency of choice. These last two factors 
also help to explain why net bond issuance by 
Canadian ﬁ  nancial and non-ﬁ  nancial corporations in 
the period just prior to the crisis was predominantly in 
Canadian dollars. 
During and after the ﬁ  nancial crisis, however, new 
issuance in the Maple Bond market was limited by 
several factors. First, there were concerns over the 
health of foreign ﬁ  nancial issuers who made up a 
dominant segment of this market, since a number of 
former issuers, such as Bear Stearns and Lehman 
Brothers, collapsed during the crisis. Second, market 
liquidity dried up in most non-core markets world-
wide, making Maple Bonds less attractive for invest-
ors.
8 There have recently been signs of a revival in this 
market, with several new issues of Maple Bonds in 
2010. 
The high-yield bond market
Over the years, Canadian ﬁ  rms have beneﬁ  ted from 
their proximity and access to the large U.S. high-yield 
debt market: the issuance of high-yield securities by 
Canadian non-ﬁ  nancial corporations (in all currencies), 
as a proportion of total bond issuance by Canadian 
non-ﬁ  nancial corporations, is comparable to that of 
U.S. non-ﬁ  nancial issuers and is much higher than 
that of both Asian and European non-ﬁ  nancial issuers 
(Chart 4).
9 Since most Canadian high-yield securities 
have historically been issued in the United States, 
high-yield bond issuance by Canadian corporations 
7  Maple Bonds are Canadian-dollar-denominated bonds issued in Canada by non-
Canadian borrowers. See Hately (2006) for an in-depth discussion of the Maple Bond 
market.
8  Liquidity in the secondary market for Maple Bonds has been limited to date, so invest-
ors may have little choice but to hold the securities until maturity. This weak secondary 
market support is partially due to the limited number of underwriters typical of most 
Maple Bond issues.
9  The overall volume of high-yield issuance in Canada varies widely because the total 
issuance of Canadian high-yield debt is generally low and is concentrated in a few large 
names. Therefore, one large issue can cause the total volume of high-yield issuance in 
Canada to spike in a given quarter.
Chart 4:  Issuance of high-yield bonds by Canadian 
issuers
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relative to the total amount of annual Canadian non-
ﬁ  nancial gross issuance (high-yield and investment-
grade) of about US$30 billion (Chart 1), the similar 
maturity structure to U.S. high-yield debt and reliance 
on that market may compound difﬁ  culties in 
reﬁ  nancing. 
There have been several high-yield 
transactions in Canada over the past 
year, pointing to a developing Canadian 
market for high-yield bonds.
Although historically most Canadian high-yield bonds 
have been issued in the large U.S. market,
13 there 
have been several high-yield transactions in Canada 
over the past year, pointing to a developing Canadian 
market for high-yield bonds. A number of factors are 
contributing to this development, including the low-
interest-rate environment; attractive spreads on high-
yield bonds relative to historical levels; as well as an 
increased appetite for high-yield bonds by Canadian 
investors, evidenced by the more than doubling of the 
assets of Canadian high-yield, ﬁ  xed-income mutual 
funds from $4.4 billion at the end of 2008 to $9.5 bil-
lion at the end of 2009 (IFIC 2009). While most of 
these recent high-yield issues in the Canadian market 
have been small in size, the trend towards more high-
yield issuance in Canada may persist, since income-
trust conversions will also be looking to issue into the 
high-yield market. 
Equity Markets
Although the ﬁ  nancial crisis originated in the United 
States, it has had a profound effect on ﬁ  nancial 
wealth around the world. Capitalization of global 
equity markets had doubled from US$30 trillion to just 
over US$60 trillion from the end of 2003 to the end of 
2007, before these gains were completely erased over 
the course of 2008 and the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2009 
(Chart 6).
14 Equity markets rebounded strongly 
through 2009 to recover about half of the decline 
experienced during the crisis. Nevertheless, the net 
loss of global wealth from the decline of US$15 trillion 
13 For example, as of July 2010, 11 per cent of the Bank of America Merrill Lynch index of 
high-yield Canadian issuers was in Canadian dollars, with the remainder in U.S. dollars.
14  During the October 1987 stock market crash, 19 of 23 major stock markets declined by 
20 per cent or more (Roll 1988). 
While the wave of LBOs in the late 1980s was driven 
by the development of the high-yield market, the LBO 
wave in 2006 and 2007 was driven largely by another 
ﬁ  nancial innovation: collateralized debt obligations 
(CDOs).
11 The advent of this source of ﬁ  nancing facili-
tated access to a wider base of investors and, in an 
environment where investors were searching for yield, 
contributed to lower spreads and looser covenants. 
CDOs also allowed larger U.S. ﬁ  rms to undergo an 
LBO that might not have been possible otherwise 
(Shivdasani and Wang 2009). Of course, in hindsight, 
these loose ﬁ  nancial conditions turned out to be a 
precursor to the ﬁ  nancial crisis.
From the beginning of the credit crisis in mid-2007 
through the end of 2008, the issuance of both high-
yield debt and CDOs dropped drastically, and credit 
spreads on high-yield issues, proxied by the Bank of 
America Merrill Lynch U.S. high-yield index, widened 
signiﬁ  cantly to over 1800 bps. Since it was no longer 
possible to securitize leveraged loans during the 
crisis, a substantial pipeline of leveraged loans 
unexpectedly remained on bank balance sheets.
12 
LBOs virtually disappeared, and some previously 
announced LBOs either collapsed or were renegoti-
ated amid the marked deterioration in credit 
conditions.
As market conditions improved in 2009, the issuance 
of high-yield debt resumed, especially in the United 
States, where it accounted for over 25 per cent of 
total corporate debt issuance in the second half of 
2009 (Chart 4). In the United States, over 78 per cent 
of high-yield issuance in 2009 reﬁ  nanced existing 
debt or extended debt maturities (Moody’s 2010b). 
Signiﬁ  cant volumes of high-yield debt will need to be 
issued in the future simply to reﬁ  nance existing debt: 
about US$200 billion of high-yield bonds and 
US$500 billion of leveraged loans are set to mature in 
the United States between 2012 and 2014 (Moody’s 
2010b). Of course, the ability to sustain this level of 
high-yield issuance is dependent on market condi-
tions, including investors’ capacity and appetite for 
risk, and deterioration of these conditions could spell 
trouble for high-yield debt issues. 
In Canada, about US$26 billion of high-yield bonds 
and leveraged loans are set to mature between 2012 
and 2014 (Moody’s 2010c). While this is small relative 
11  CDOs generally have bank loans (referred to as collateralized loan obligations or CLOs), 
bonds (referred to as collateralized bond obligations or CBOs), structured ﬁ  nance 
(e.g., ABS, MBS, other CDOs) or some mixture of the above as their collateral. 
12 In June 2007, the pipeline of banks’ leveraged loan and bond commitments was about 
US$400 billion but has since declined (CGFS 2008). Source: Lehman, S&P Leveraged 
Commentary and Data
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income-trust conversions, which partially explains this 
more muted decline. Equity issuance by U.S. ﬁ  rms did 
not increase as dramatically as that of Canadian ﬁ  rms 
from 2003 to 2007 but, nonetheless, declined in the 
second half of 2008 (Chart 8). 
While total equity issuance was less affected during 
the crisis than issuance in other segments of capital 
markets, such as debt and securitized products, there 
has been a marked change in the distribution of issu-
ance between ﬁ  nancial and non-ﬁ  nancial corporations 
since the onset of the crisis. In both Canada and the 
United States, the issuance of non-ﬁ  nancial equity 
declined substantially during the poor market condi-
tions (e.g., low market valuations) in the second half of 
2008.
16 However, as market valuations rebounded 
16 Firms could also rely on internal sources of funds. Non-ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms in both countries 
had steadily increased the proportion of assets held in cash since the 1990s (McVanel 
and Perevalov 2008; Bates, Kahle, and Stulz 2008).
in global equity market capitalization from the peak 
still represents about a quarter of global GDP. To put 
the magnitude of this US$30 trillion drop in wealth in 
perspective, it is more than ten times as large as the 
global writedowns by ﬁ  nancial institutions during the 
crisis (estimated at US$2.3 trillion). 
Canadian equity markets have experienced similar 
ﬂ  uctuations in capitalization: it rose from US$1 trillion 
at the end of 2004 to US$1.75 trillion at the end of 
2007, then fell to US$1 trillion at the end of 2008, 
before partly recovering to US$1.6 trillion at the end of 
2009.
15 Over the same period, combined market 
capitalization in BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, 
and China) followed a similar path but increased much 
more markedly, from US$1 trillion at the end of 2004 
to US$6 trillion at the end of 2009, reﬂ  ecting the 
growing importance of these emerging markets in the 
global economy and market place. 
Equity issuance
The volume of equity raised by Canadian ﬁ  rms has 
increased over the past ten years: the total annual 
value of equity issued in 2007 was more than double 
its 2003 level (Chart 7). While there was a temporary 
decline in equity issuance by Canadian ﬁ  rms during 
the worst of the ﬁ  nancial crisis, this decline was much 
more muted than that observed in other markets, and 
the amount of equity issued was still above the levels 
seen from 1998 through 2006. However, some of the 
15 Pichette (2004) examines the relationship between consumer spending and wealth and 
ﬁ  nds that consumer spending responds to changes in housing wealth but responds 
very little to changes in equity wealth. She posits that the lower sensitivity to changes 
in equity wealth can be explained by the more transitory nature of equity-price changes 
and by the concentration of equity ownership among a small proportion of households.
Chart 7:  Canadian issuance of common equity
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19 Nevertheless, there are 
differences between the U.S. and Canadian securi-
tization markets in terms of relative size, breadth of 
development, and structure. 
Residential mortgage-backed securities 
In the years leading to the crisis, the securitization of 
mortgages became a more important source of 
credit, enabling Canadian banks to increase lending 
to households. This was particularly true for National 
Housing Act Mortgage Backed Securities (NHA MBS), 
which increased from about 5 per cent of outstanding 
residential mortgages in 1998 to almost 20 per cent in 
2007 (Chart 9).
20 This upward trend was at least 
partly due to changes in the NHA MBS program (e.g., 
the introduction of NHA MBS with more ﬂ  exible fea-
tures), the creation of the Canada Mortgage Bond 
(CMB) program in 2001, and increased investor 
demand for securitized products. The further increase 
in government-guaranteed MBS at the end of 2008 
and in 2009 can be attributed to the government’s 
IMPP, which brought the proportion of government-
guaranteed MBS in Canadian mortgages to 30 per 
cent by the end of 2009.
21 
Non-government-guaranteed securitization in Canada 
was used more for subprime mortgages than for 
19 For a discussion of the economic beneﬁ  ts and potentially destabilizing effect of securi-
tization, see Selody and Woodman (2009).
20 NHA MBS are backed by mortgages that beneﬁ  t from an explicit government guar-
antee. The NHA MBS themselves also beneﬁ  t from a government guarantee of timely 
payment of interest and principal.
21 The government announced that it would purchase up to Can$125 billion in NHA MBS. 
In total, Can$69 billion of NHA MBS were purchased under this program.
from the lows reached in March 2009 and as the 
investors demanded higher returns—with higher risk—
the issuance of Canadian and U.S. non-ﬁ  nancial 
equity returned to pre-crisis levels.
17
In contrast, global ﬁ  nancial institutions have increased 
their equity issuance substantially to offset the effect 
of the large writedowns and losses experienced 
during the crisis and to build capital in anticipation of 
more stringent regulatory requirements. As of July 
2010, ﬁ  nancial institutions, mainly from Europe and 
the United States, had raised US$1.5 trillion in new 
private and public capital since mid-2007 to offset 
US$1.8 trillion in writedowns and losses.
18 Canadian 
institutions have had considerably fewer writedowns 
and losses (US$21 billion), have raised US$14 billion in 
private capital, and did not require any capital injec-
tion from the public sector. In 2008, ﬁ  nancial equity 
issuance accounted for 32 per cent and 64 per cent 
of total equity issuance in Canada and the United 
States, respectively, compared with an average of 
9 per cent and 26 per cent, from 1998 through 2006. 
A similar pattern was evident in Europe.
The future issuance of equity by ﬁ  nancial corporations 
will depend on the amount of future writedowns and 
on the need to strengthen their capital positions. 
While the IMF estimates that approximately $550 bil-
lion of bank writedowns had not yet been realized by 
mid-2010 (IMF 2010b), it also suggests that most of 
this amount could be covered by earnings of the 
aggregate banking system (IMF 2010a). Also, banks 
may need to issue some equity to strengthen their 
capital position to meet the proposed revisions to 
capital requirements, which call for an improvement 
in the quality of the capital base of banks and higher 
minimum levels of capital (BCBS 2010). However, 
since banks can strengthen their capital position 
through retained earnings during the phase-in period 
for these revisions, there may be less need for the 
issuance of more common equity.
Securitization
The securitization process converts pools of non-
marketable assets, such as loans, mortgages, and 
credit card receivables, into marketable securities. 
Prior to the ﬁ  nancial crisis, securitization had become 
an important source of credit in developed econ-
omies, particularly in the United States and, to a 
17  Baker and Wurgler (2000) investigate the relation between market valuations and 
equity issuance.
18 Source: Bloomberg, 19 July 2010.
Chart 9:  Canadian RMBS outstanding
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related to those assets were not fully transferred away 
from the banks (Acharya and Richardson 2009). Amid 
these losses, the issuance of non-government-
guaranteed MBS virtually disappeared in 2008, 
resulting in a decline in the absolute level of non-
government-sponsored MBS as older issues matured. 
Asset-backed securities 
The market for term asset-backed securities (ABS) in 
Canada is relatively small, with just under $50 billion 
outstanding at the end of 2009 (Chart 11). The two 
largest segments of this market are ABS backed by 
credit card receivables and commercial mortgage-
backed securities (CMBS), which together account for 
about three-quarters of outstanding amounts. The 
third largest segment is ABS backed by auto loans 
and leases. As in other markets, ABS issuance was 
severely disrupted by the ﬁ  nancial crisis, and yield 
spreads on ABS widened signiﬁ  cantly.
23 To address 
these disruptions in the Canadian ABS market and to 
help consumers and businesses to ﬁ  nance the pur-
chase of new vehicles and equipment, the federal 
government announced the Canadian Secured Credit 
Facility (CSCF) in its Economic Action Plan of January 
2009. Administered by the Business Development 
Bank of Canada (BDC), the program could purchase 
up to $12 billion of newly issued ABS backed by 
vehicle and equipment loans and leases.
24 
23 For example, spreads on 3-year Schedule l bank credit card programs widened to 
over 350 bps, from about 50 bps prior to the crisis. Spreads on non-bank credit card 
programs widened even further. Source: RBC Capital Markets.
24 By the time the CSCF expired in March 2010, the BDC had purchased $3.7 billion of 
ABS (Halde 2010).
prime mortgages (Traclet 2010). Subprime-mortgage 
markets were much less developed in Canada than in 
the United States, reﬂ  ecting the more conservative 
nature of Canadian investors and of Canadian mort-
gage-lending practices. Hence, the non-government-
guaranteed segment of the market for residential 
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) in Canada is 
small at less than 3 per cent of the total amount of 
residential mortgages outstanding at the end of 2007, 
and this proportion has since declined. 
In the United States, the share of total RMBS (govern-
ment-sponsored and non-government-sponsored) 
relative to total outstanding mortgages has increased 
slightly over time (Chart 10). However, the breakdown 
between government-sponsored and non-govern-
ment-sponsored MBS changed: from 2000 to 2006, 
the government-sponsored share declined by 10 per 
cent as the non-government-sponsored MBS share 
(backed by jumbo, Alt-A, and subprime mortgages) 
increased by a similar amount. 
The securitization of subprime mortgages reduced 
incentives for the monitoring and screening of bor-
rowers and, over time, led to a strong deterioration in 
lending standards and, consequently, in the credit 
quality of the mortgages underlying non-government-
guaranteed MBS.
22 Although securitization removed 
subprime-mortgage assets from bank balance sheets, 
22 See Paligorova (2009) for a discussion of agency problems in the securitization 
process. Ashcraft and Schuermann (2008) identify seven informational frictions in 
the process of subprime-mortgage securitization and discuss how these frictions can 
contribute to problems with mortgage securitization. Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2008) 
ﬁ  nd evidence of deterioration in the quality of subprime-mortgage loans in the years 
leading up to the crisis.
Chart 11:  Canadian term ABS outstanding
By asset type
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2008, the issuance of term ABS came to a complete 
halt, as spreads on the traditional ABS asset classes 
exploded. This lack of issuance and the sharp 
increase in spreads prompted the Federal Reserve to 
announce a US$200 billion Term Asset-Backed 
Securities Loan Facility (TALF) on 25 November 2008, 
to “help market participants meet the credit needs of 
households and small businesses by supporting the 
issuance of asset-backed securities (ABS).” 
27 The 
TALF offered non-recourse three- or ﬁ  ve-year loans to 
investors, collateralized by certain types of ABS that 
were eligible for the program. Since the implementa-
tion of the TALF, ABS spreads have retreated, and 
issuance has resumed, although less strongly than 
before the crisis. Initially accounting for about half of 
non-mortgage ABS issuance, the TALF was no longer 
being used extensively when it expired in 2010 (Sack 
2010).
The ﬁ  nancial crisis will undoubtedly 
have a long-lasting effect on 
securitization markets.
The ﬁ  nancial crisis will undoubtedly have a long-
lasting effect on securitization markets, and future 
levels of issuance in these markets will depend on 
reducing the conﬂ  icts of interest in the securitization 
process, simplifying and standardizing securitization 
27 The TALF was tweaked several times, following the original announcement. See 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/talf.html 
After the announcement of the CSCF, and helped by 
positive developments in other securitization markets 
(mainly the introduction of the Term Asset-Backed 
Securities Loan Facility by the U.S. Federal Reserve) 
and improvements in ﬁ  nancial market conditions more 
generally, spreads on Canadian ABS tightened.
25 
However, from the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2008 to the ﬁ  rst 
quarter of 2010, the ABS market shrank from $52 bil-
lion to $47 billion as maturities outpaced new issues 
(Chart 11). Anecdotal evidence suggests that this was 
caused as much by a limited supply of assets to 
securitize, because of weak credit demand and the 
availability of cheaper funding alternatives, as by a 
lack of investor demand or an impaired market. 
However, there are signs that the Canadian securitiza-
tion market has been recovering in 2010. Through the 
ﬁ  rst three quarters of 2010, almost $8 billion of non-
CSCF term ABS transactions were made in the 
Canadian market, compared with less than $6 billion 
throughout 2009.
A number of notable differences between Canadian 
and U.S. ABS markets contribute to explaining the 
stronger impact of the crisis on the U.S. securitization 
market.
26 First, the distribution of collateral types is 
signiﬁ  cantly different, with home-equity loans repre-
senting a much larger—and growing—share of the 
U.S. market prior to the crisis (Chart 12). Traditionally 
having second lien status, home equity lines of credit 
were used more heavily in the United States to cash 
out on increasing home values (Lucas, Goodman, and 
Fabozzi 2006). The issuance of ABS backed by home 
equity loans—the largest category of ABS issuance in 
the United States prior to the crisis—disappeared 
amid the correction in the U.S. housing market. 
Second, the fundamentals of the underlying collateral 
were healthier in Canada. For example, delinquency 
rates on CMBS remain below 1 per cent in Canada, 
whereas U.S. delinquency rates have risen above 
8 per cent, owing to stress in the U.S. commercial real 
estate market (DBRS 2010). Delinquency rates on 
credit card ABS also remain much lower in Canada 
than in the United States.
With the onset of the global credit crunch in 2008, 
U.S. issuance of ABS slowed considerably to levels 
25 For example, spreads on 3-year Schedule l bank credit card programs tightened to 
75 bps towards the end of 2009. Source: RBC Capital Markets.
26 This article does not focus on issuance in short-term markets; however, it is important 
to mention that the crisis had a strong impact on the Canadian market for non-bank-
sponsored ABCP. The majority of assets underlying the non-bank-sponsored ABCP 
conduits were CDOs. Trading in this market came to a halt in 2007, and the non-bank-
sponsored ABCP was subsequently restructured into ﬂ  oating rate notes. The market 
for bank-sponsored ABCP, while more resilient, was also affected by the crisis, and 
the outstanding amount of ABCP has declined. For a discussion of the Canadian ABCP 
market, see Kamhi and Tuer (2007a, 2007b).
Chart 12:  U.S. ABS issuance
By asset type
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